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BOOK REVIEW
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By Raoul Berger.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1973. xii+
345 pages. $14.95.
DAVID A. HIGLEY*
mpeachment. The very word stirs the emotions for it strikes at the
essence of our constitutional republic: the separation of powers. To
the layman, the procedure is rife with political factionalism. More-
over, there is widespread concern that resort to the process will rend
the very foundations of our democracy.' The politician, must con-
sider the intolerable time-consuming burdens of the process2 and the
need to maintain political credibility with his constituents. A defini-
tive explanation of the meaning and parameters of the Constitution's
impeachment provisions would help clarify the issues. Fortunately, at
a time when analysis and explication of the removal process is sorely
requisite, Harvard Senior Fellow Raoul Berger has published Im-
peachment: The Constitutional Problems. This text provides answers
to perplexing problems and reopens for provoking discussion ques-
tions thought long settled by historical practice.
Mr. Berger relates that the American procedure for removal of cor-
rupt public officials has its roots in the English impeachment and
treason trials "when the Commons undertook to prosecute before
the Lords the most powerful offenders and the highest officers of the
* Member of the New York Bar. B.S., State University of New York at Buffalo,
1963; J.D., 1971. Captain, United States Marine Corps. Presently serving as Appellate
Defense Counsel, Navy Appellate Review Activity, Office of the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect Depart-
ment of Defense or United States Marine Corps policy.
1. E.g., during a demonstration before the White House on Sunday, October 21,
1973, one woman observed: "I don't have confidence in him [the President] any more,
but I'm not sure I like the alternative. We don't even have a vice president." Washington
Post, Oct. 22, 1973, § A, at 19, col. 8. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew had resigned on
October 10, 1973, and Congressman Gerald R. Ford had been nominated on October
12, 1973, to fill the office of vice president. See, U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
2. Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black referred to the procedure as "the admittedly diffi-
cult method of impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by two-
thirds of the Senate." Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 142 (1970) (dissenting
opinion).
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Crown."3 Reflecting at length upon the use, disuse, and revival of the
procedure by the English Parliament prior to the American consti-
tutional convention, Berger notes that impeachment became "a clumsy
instrument ' 4 which was often supplanted by the bill of attainder" and
removal by Address of Parliament. Furthermore, according to the
author, Parliament's power to declare treasons with retroactive effect
was "untrammeled. '' 7 The history of the English treason and impeach-
ment trials "plainly" reveals that "an indictable treason was not the pre-
requisite of impeachment."8
The United States Constitution provides for impeachment in the
case of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."D
Berger reports that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors," orig-
inated historically in an impeachment rather than an ordinary crim-
inal proceeding and substantively encompasses "a category of political
crimes against the state."' 10 Since English impeachment proceeded for
offenses "not 'criminal' in the sense of the general criminal law,"'1 the
phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" must have a limited and tech-
nical meaning12 and was so recognized by the framers of the Constitu-
tion.18 Thus, Mr. Berger is able to conclude that the boundaries of the
3. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLIMS 1 (1973) [herein-
after cited as BERGER]. The king being "beyond their reach," Parliament sought to hold
his ministers accountable, and this notwithstanding that the minister was carrying out the
king's decree, for it was "intolerable for a minister, not merely to give unlawful advice,
but to continue to serve a king whose policies were hateful to the nation .... " Id. at 2,
44 n.209.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. "[A] legislative condemnation to death without a trial." Id.
6. Id. Berger provides the following definition: "[A]n Address was a formal re-
quest made by both Houses of Parliament to the King, asking him to perform some
act." Id. at 145 n.104.
7. Id. at 44, 46, 48, 49, 52, citing 2 J. CAMPBELL, LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTIcES
OF ENGLAND 269 (1874). "[T]he two Houses of Parliament might retrospectively de-
clare anything to be treason, according to their discretion and punish it capitally."
BERGER 47.
8. Id. at 52.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. "[T]he word 'high' in 'high crimes and misdemeanors'
modifies both 'crimes and misdemeanors.'" BERGER 74 n.108. See also id. at 161 n.178.
10. BERGER 61. Berger states that "misdemeanors" referred to "criminal sanctions
for private wrongs." Id. "[Pjolitical crimes describes misconduct in office as distinguished
from ordinary crimes," but impeachment may "lie for out-of-office misconduct" if the
misconduct "has a destructive impact upon confidence in public administration." Id. at
62 n.32, 71 n.92, 200.
11. Id. at 69. I do not read Mr. Berger as stating that an impeachable offense may
not be a crime, only that it need not be. See id. at 79.
12. Id. at 71, 74, 76, 86, 163-64.
13. Id. at 71, 74.
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impeachment power committed to Congress by the Constitution1 4 are
to be ascertained by reference to the common law15 and that "impeach-
ment was meant only for 'great injuries,' 'great misdemeanors.' "16
Turthermore, since English impeachment proceeded in the absence of
an indictable offense, likewise could its American cousinYz'
Mr. Berger's view of the impeachment process thereafter breaks
down into three main areas: First, "high crimes and misdemeanors"
means one thing when applied to the President and another when the
conduct of a lesser official is called into question; second, impeachment
is not the sole method for removal of a member of the federal judiciary;
finally, a member of the judiciary may be "removed" from office upon
becoming insane, disabled or senile. 8 The remainder of this review will
touch briefly on each of these three positions.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id., art. I, § 3; id., art. II, § 4. Article I, § 2 in part
provides that, "[t]he House of Representatives . . .shall have sole Power of Impeach-
ment." Article I, § 3 in pertinent part states:
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person
shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.
Article II, § 4 reads:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
15. BERGER 87.
16. Id. at 88, 91.
17. Id. at 58, 67, 78 n.127, 297. Mr. Berger comments at some length on the
memorandum prepared by Simon H. Rifkind as counsel for Mr. Justice William 0.
Douglas and one comment by Mr. Berger deserves attention:
According to Mr. Rifkind, [Judge John] Pickering was charged "with three
counts of wilfully violating a Federal statute relating to the posting of bond
in certain attachment situations, and the misdemeanors of public drunkenness
and blasphemy." . . . No federal statute made violation of the bond-posting
statute a crime; nor did a federal statute make either drunkenness or blas-
phemy a crime. To assume that either drunkenness or blasphemy might be a
crime by State law would make impeachment turn on whether a judge blas-
phemed or was drunk in one State rather than another.
Id. at 57 n.15 (emphasis added). I am not troubled, as Mr. Berger appears to be, by
the italicized proposition. At least one federal statute provides for the assimilation of
state law into federal law. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1948). The provi-
sion has been held to be constitutional, United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. -286
(1958), and it applies to federal court houses. Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36
(1908). Cf. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). Judge Pickering was "con-
victed ... for presiding while drunk." BERGER 183-84.
18. There are at least three additional lesser positions. First, impeachment is a
noncriminal proceeding (BERGER 78-85); second, impeachment is subject to judicial
review (id. at 103-21); third, Senators and Congressmen are subject to impeachment
(id. at 214-23). These propositions will not be discussed in this review.
451
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Impeachment: The Double Standard
According to the Constitution, impeachable offenses are "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."19 On its face, this
provision suggests that impeachment standards for any high government
official are the same and that the gravity of the misconduct is irrele-
vant.2 0 Offering a conflicting theory, Mr. Berger states "the 'great offenses'
applicable to the impeachment of the President do not limit the com-
mon law scope of 'high crimes and misdemeanors' when the subject of
impeachment is a judge." 21 Admittedly, this is a retreat from an earlier
position,22 for in the Yale Law Journal the author stated:
If the Framers intended to make judges impeachable for lesser crimes
than the President and other civil officers, they chose a singularly
inept way of articulating their intention, for they employed one and
the same phrase, "high crimes and misdemeanors" for "President,
Vice President and other civil officers" without naming judges at all,
and without the slightest intimation that "high crimes and misde-
meanors" was to have two different meanings, one for judges and one
for the President and other civil officers. One who would give those
words two entirely different meanings, turning on the person to whom
they are applied, must demonstrate that such was the manifest in-
tention of the Framers, a demonstration that has yet to be made.23
The author's shift in position appears to be based on two fac-
tors: First, the framers were almost exclusively concerned with im-
peachment of the President, and then only for "great offenses." "There
was no intimation that the restrictive standards deemed appropriate
for removal of the President were likewise to apply to removal of
judges. " 24 However, in his prior article on impeachment, Berger failed
to find historical foundation for his dual standard.
It is the record of the several Conventions rather than the "guilty"
or "not guilty" verdicts of the Senate that constitute the index of
Constitutional interpretation. Of a special concern that judges be
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
20. See Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," 44 So. CALIV.
L. REv. 395, 458 (1971): "Although the removal of judges was decidedly peripheral
to concern with executive encroachments, being governed by the same language it is
subject to the same limits." See also Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Be-
havior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475, 1511-12 (1970).
21. BERGER 93.
22. Id. at 91, 93.
23. Berger, supra note 20, at 1511-12.
24. BERGER 91.
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held to "higher standards," that is, be impeachable for lesser "high
crimes and misdemeanors" than the President or other civil officers,
there is not a trace.2
5
A second factor adopted by the author to support the double
standard theory is that "[r]emoval of the President must generate
shock waves that can rock the very foundations of government,"
whereas removal of a lowly district court judge or even a Justice of
the United States Supreme Court "does not have nearly the same im-
pact."26 Corollary to this theory is the notion that should the President
bring his office into "disgrace... by a lesser offense.., the people can
remove him at the polls." 2r Judges, on the other hand, are not remov-
able by franchise, and the framers, by providing judicial "good be-
havior" tenure, "did not intend to shelter those who indulged in dis-
graceful conduct short of 'great offenses.' "28 The validity of this theory
rests on the assumptions that (1) the President may be expected to
disgrace his office only at the end of his term of office, (2) the people
can appreciate the magnitude of their constitutional duty, and (3) the
line of demarcation from "great" to "lesser" offense is clearly and con-
stitutionally delineated. Since I doubt that any of these premises can
be maintained with authority, I am unable to agree with the position.
Of course, the "removal at the polls" doctrine will have no impact on
a President who is serving in his second term of office, and it would be
a wicked proposition to subject the electorate to the will of a Presi-
dent who has disgraced his office shortly after assuming the position of
Chief Executive. If it is traumatic to remove a President from office
by impeachment, the shock will be present without regard to the gravity
of the offense. And if an individual may disgrace the Presidency by
"greater" or "lesser" conduct, one wonders at the wisdom of a policy
permitting removal for the former but not for the latter.
Adoption of the double standard might encourage development of
multiple standards. Mr. Berger asserts that members of the federal judi-
25. See note 23 supra (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
26. BEROER 91, 92.
27. Id. at 92.
28. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,




ciary may be impeached for conduct less onerous than that required for
the impeachment of the President. 29 If one standard is established for
the President, and another for the federal judiciary, is it not possible for
the Justices of the Supreme Court to claim yet another standard to
judge their conduct,30 and members of the Cabinet not otherwise re-
moved by the President 3' to assert still a fourth? If "the rule of law
implies equality and justice in its application,"3 2 the proliferation of
separate standards cannot be justified.
Judicial Enforcement of "Good Behavior" Tenure
The constitutional tenure of members of the Federal article III
judiciary is during "good behavior. ' 33 Mr. Berger relates that at com-
mon law, tenure during good behavior was terminated by bad behavior"4
and that the framers of the Constitution employed the term "with no
indication that they were employing it in a new and different sense,"
thus, the phrase was adopted from the common law and accompanied
by all its incidents.3 5 The most notable incident is the writ of scire
facias, a proceeding to repeal a patent in case of forfeiture. Though
"there is no English case wherein a judge comparable to a federal judge
was removed in a judicial proceeding," 3 the author nevertheless reports
that "[e]minent scholars ... consider that removal of judges by scire
facias remains available in England," and "leading judges had recog-
nized its availability for the trial of judicial misbehavior."3 7 Mr. Berger,
therefore, suggests that Congress enact enabling legislation to ensure
29. Id. at 92. "Serious infractions of 'good behavior,' though less than 'great of-
fenses,' may yet amount to 'high crimes and misdemeanors' at common law." Id. Ap-
parently, this view is not based upon some inflated ethical concept of the judiciary, for
when Congressman Gerald R. Ford asserted that position, Mr. Berger renounced
it. Berger, supra note 20, at 1511.
30. Berger notes that in England judges were tried or impeached "according to
the rank of the offenders." BERGER 248.
31. Id. at 197 n.26. "[R]arely indeed would the President insist, for example,
upon retaining a Cabinet officer who brought disgrace upon his office and therefore
upon the administration. Practical politics would demand his immediate resignation or
dismissal." Id. Apparently, there is room for exceptions, and one wonders if the mis-
conduct of members of the Executive, Legislative or Judicial branches is always com-
municated to the Congress or the public.
32. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
33. See note 28 supra.
34. BERGER 124-26.
35. Id. at 131, 176.
36. Id. at 127. See also id. at 177. "[Florfeiture upon breach of a condition sub-
sequent was a judicial function. . . ." Id.
37. Id. at 130-31.
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that "good behavior" is not to become an impotent formula.38 Under
the Berger scheme, trial by judges would be preferred to impeach-
men. 3 9 "[I]t would be unbecoming for a Justice [or judge] to complain
of trial before such a court when his fellow citizens are daily being
tried for life or deprivation of property before a solitary district
judge. '40
Several difficulties arise with the removal of members of the federal
judiciary by the process of judicial trial rather than impeachment.
First, a comment must be directed to the lack of any substantial
discussion of the fundamental purpose of a separate and independent
judiciary. As the late Mr. Justice John M. Harlan once stated, "the
importance of an independent federal judiciary... holds a profoundly
important place in our scheme of government." 41 Mr. Berger fails
to consider United States Supreme Court cases such as O'Donoghue
v. United States,4- and Evans v. Gore,43 which uphold the great under-
lying purpose of independence and tenure. Whether Berger's concept
of judicial trial can be squared with these purposes remains unde-
veloped.
A second consideration which is certainly as important as the first
is whether the Berger concept can be squared with the Supreme
Court's announced view in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,44
another decision not mentioned by the author. In Quarles, a majority
of the Court stated that impeachment is the exclusive means for re-
moval of article III judges:
Article III provides for the establishment of a court system as
one of the separate but coordinate branches of the National Gov-
ernment. It is the primary, indeed the sole business of these courts
to try cases and controversies between individuals and between indi-
viduals and the Government. This includes trial of criminal cases.
These courts are presided over by judges appointed for life, subject
only to removal by impeachment.45
38. Id. at 132-35.
39. Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 176. If the limited purpose of impeachment is removal from office, is
there not a significant difference between impeachment and the criminal proceeding
referred to by Berger? See id. at 79.
41. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 129 (1970) (concurring opinion).
42. 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
43. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
44. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See also Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208, 210
(Ct. Cl. 1948); Clark v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 594, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1947), cert. de-
nied, 333 U.S. 833 (1948).
45. 350 U.S. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
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The Court's opinion in Quarles was delivered by the late Mr. Justice
Hugo L. Black, and was concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Earl War-
ren, and Justices Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, Tom C.
Clark, and John M. Harlan, no novices in the area of constitutional
adjudication.46 Interestingly, no authority was cited for the italicized
proposition, undoubtedly because these able jurists "assumed that the
proposition required no citation."47
Third, Mr. Berger recites that when construing the various passages
of the Constitution, we should look to the explanations offered by the
members of the various ratification conventions: "[A]s Jefferson and
Madison emphasized, the meaning of the Constitution is to be sought
in the explanation made to those who adopted it."'4s Yet it seems to me
that the author was not faithful to this expressed view. Alexander
Hamilton, "the recognized leader of the forces of ratification in New
York," 49 wrote in The Federalist No. 79:
The precautions for their [article III judges] responsibility are com-
prised in the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be
impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and tried
by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office and
disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the
point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judi-
cial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitu-
tion in respect to our own judges.5"
Mr. Berger is aware of the view of Alexander Hamilton,"1 but appar-
ently considers it and other similar remarks by framers of the Constitu-
tion as mere convention-corridor gossip.52
46. Of these jurists, three-Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Frank-
furter-generally have been recognized as among the most outstanding Justices of the
Supreme Court, and two-Douglas and Harlan--often have been described as "near
great." Blaustein & Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 1183, 1185
(1972).
47. BERGER 237.
48. Id. at 116. See also id. at 116 n.58, 219. "[Tihe action of the Ratifiers carried
even greater weight than the views expressed at the Convention .... " Id. See also id.
at 283-85.
49. Tnn FEDERAL ST PAPERS iX (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
50. Id. at 474 (emphasis added). According to Martha Ziskind, "Hamilton was a
truthful propagandist." Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English
and American Precedents, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 135, 152.
51. BERGER 137-38.
52. Id. at 149 ("passing assertions in the halls of Congress"). Mr. Berger notes
the remarks of Abraham Baldwin, a framer of the Constitution: "The judges are
appointed by the President but they are only removable by impeachment. The President
has no agency in the removal." Id. (emphasis added).
456
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A fourth difficulty is the lack of any historical precedent for this
procedure. Berger notes that the United States Senate has embraced
the notion that it must sit as a body to try impeachments, "a prac-
tice from which, despite the onerous burdens it imposes, it has never
departed, and which constitutes a constitutional interpretation en-
tirely in harmony with the constitutional design. ' 53 The author how-
ever cites not a single instance of judicial removal of an article III
judge: "[I]n the 182 years since adoption of the Constitution only nine
judges have been impeached and only four convicted and removed." 54
Has not the Constitution been interpreted by historical practice? Cer-
tainly, our history is not disharmonious with the constitutional design.
A fifth and by no means insignificant problem with the Berger
proposal is defining the constitutional parameters of the judicial re-
moval process. It seems to me that there is a substantial difference
between being removed from office upon a vote of the entire Senate,55
which requires the "concurrence of two-thirds," 56 and the procedure
for removal of federal judges recommended by Mr. Berger: "[A]
mixture of circuit and district judges with perhaps one Supreme Court
Justice in order to secure a cross section of judicial opinion."' 51 Thus,
while impeachment contemplates a vote of the Senate as a body, the
Berger proposition permits removal of any judge or Justice at the
behest of an ill-defined "court." Implicit in his definition of the
body is that not all active judges need be present. And let it be very
clear that further Supreme Court review of the judicial removal
53. Id. at 172.
54. Id. at 166. Mr. Berger continues:
That, however, does not tell the whole story of the fifty-five judges who were
investigated by the House, "eight [and one Justice] were impeached, eight
were censured but not impeached, seventeen others resigned at one stage or
another in the conduct of the investigation, while the rest were absolved of
impeachable misconduct. Added to this are the undetermined number of judges
who resigned upon the mere threat of inquiry; for them there are no adequate
records." This after sifting "the hundreds of complaints that have been regis-
tered" over the years. That the adequacy of the sifting leaves something to be
desired is revealed by the House's own records.
Id. (footnotes omitted). It seems to me that congressional inefficiency is quite beside
the point. Regardless of the need for the Senate to sit as a body to try impeachments,
is there any reason why the House may not maintain a staff of legal advisors to whom
complaints may be forwarded and who may be empowered to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the allegations of misconduct? Congressional inefficiency is certainly no
reason to shift the burden to the judiciary.
55. Id. at 172.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
57. BERGER 175.
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process will not serve to reduce this substantial difference, for that
relief, according to Mr. Berger, is likewise to be permitted for those im-
peached by the House of Representatives and convicted by the Senate."
In this regard, let me posit a few more questions. To be con-
victed by the Senate requires a two-thirds vote; what is the vote of the
Berger court requisite to removal? What is the standard of proof (i.e.,
preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt),
especially if the procedure is civil in nature?"9 What is the standard
of Supreme Court review (i.e., substantial evidence, etc.)? Who has
standing to raise the issue?60 What types of offenses justify removal?"'
If each coordinate branch of the federal government cannot be left to
determine the scope of its own powers,62 who then reviews the judicial
process of removal? Are there constraints for action motivated by dif-
ferences in philosophical viewpoints? Consider the remarks of Mr.
Justice Douglas with respect to the latter question:
where is no power under our Constitution for one group of fed-
eral judges to censor or discipline any federal judge and no power
to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a judge.
The mood of some federal judges is opposed to this view and
they are active in attempting to make all federal judges walk in some
uniform step. What has happened to petitioner is not a rare in-
stance; it has happened to other federal judges who have had perhaps
a more libertarian approach to the Bill of Rights than their brethren.
The result is that the nonconformist has suffered greatly at the hands
of his fellow judges.
The problem is not resolved by saying that only judicial admin-
istrative matters are involved. The power to keep a particular judge
from sitting on a racial case, a church-and-state case, a free-press
case, a search-and-seizure case, a railroad case, an antitrust case, or a
union case may have profound consequences. Judges are not fungible;
they cover the constitutional spectrum; and a particular judge's em-
phasis may make a world of difference when it comes to rulings on
58. Id. at 103-21. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 507 n.27 (1969).
59. Cf. BERGER 172. "Jefferson mistakenly conceived the American impeachment
to be criminal in nature." Id.
60. One wonders whether losing litigants should be permitted to press the issue
of judicial "bad behavior."
61. Mr. Berger suggests the standard: "[RNemoval should be for cause, for serious
cause." BERGER 213. Is this more precise than the "maladministration" rejected by
James Madison and the framers of the Constitution as a measure of impeachable of-
fenses? Id. at 74, 86, 107.
62. Id. at 110.
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evidence, the temper of the courtroom, the tolerance for a proffered
defense, and the like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about
"shopping" for a judge; Senators recognize this when they are asked
to give their "advice and consent" to judicial appointments; laymen
recognize this when they appraise the quality and image of the judi-
ciary in their own community.
These are subtle, imponderable factors which other judges should
not be allowed to manipulate to further their own concept of the pub-
lic good.03
The Justice concludes, "it is time that an end be put to these efforts
of federal judges to ride herd on other federal judges. This is a form
of 'hazing' having no place under the Constitution." 4
These and other problems come to mind when reflecting upon the
Berger proposal for removal by judicial trial. This author is of the
opinion that the position does not accord sufficient respect for the es-
sentiality of independence of the federal judiciary and each of its
members. Prior to the enactment of any enabling legislation permitting
such procedure, "further analysis"' 5 and deliberation are necessary.
"Removal" for Insanity, Disability or Senility
Mr. Berger concludes "that removal of the President by impeach-
ment was not to include his removal for 'disability.' "06 However,
Berger argues that the impeachment provisions should be "construed
to comprehend removal both of insane and incapacitated judges," 67
and that the judiciary should be permitted to remove an incapacitated
jurist. 8
It must be questioned whether the procedure espoused by Mr.
Berger is either wise or necessary. Certainly, in view of the unfortu-
nate and noncriminal aspects of dementia and disability, the wisdom
of subjecting a judge so afflicted to the disapprobation associated
with removal is questionable. Furthermore, as the following opinion
of the Comptroller General of the United States indicates, less drastic
means are available for handling the removal of an insane judge.
63. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
64. Id. at 140.
65. BERGER 298.
66. Id. at 182.
67. Id. at 187.
68. Id. at 191.
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To the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
March 10, 1965:
Your letter of March 1, 1965, with enclosure, asks our opinion
whether a district judge, found to be disabled within the purview
of the act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 903, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
372(b), may continue to receive full pay if the President finds it is
necessary to appoint an additional judge for efficient dispatch of
business.
Your letter encloses a copy of a memorandum opinion, dated
February 5, 1965, from the Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Acting Deputy Attorney General which, in
part, reads as follows:
"2. Failure of disabled judge to retire. 28 U.S.C. 372(b) con-
trols the situation of a judge who could retire under 28 U.S.C.
372 (a) but fails to do so. If the judge is a district or circuit judge, a
majority of the Judicial Council of his circuit (i.e., the Chief Judge
and the circuit judges for the circuit in regular active service, 28
U.S.C. 332) may present to the President a certificate of the judge's
disability. If the President finds that the judge is unable to discharge
efficiently all the duties of his office by reason of permanent mental or
physical disability, and that the appointment of an additional judge
is necessary for the efficient dispatch of business, the President may
make such appointment by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Where an additional judge is appointed, the vacancy subse-
quently created by the death, resignation, or retirement of the disabled
judge shall not be filled. The judge, whose disability causes the ap-
pointment of an additional judge, remains a judge, entitled to full
pay, since under the Constitution he can be removed only by im-
peachment.
"Since a certificate of disability, even if accepted by the Presi-
dent, does not accomplish the retirement of a judge, he would, as
mentioned above, be entitled to full pay. Thus there can be no viola-
tion of Article III, § 1, of the Constitution, and the question of half-
pay is not involved."
We concur in the above-quoted view of the Assistant Attorney
General. Therefore your question is answered in the affirmative.09
Consequently, if insanity, disability and senility are problems for the
federal judiciary, there appears to be an available remedy to alleviate
the strain. Resort to the stringent process of removal is simply
unnecessary.
69. 44 COMP. GEN. 544 (1965). See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the




Before closing this review, it is important to turn to a subject that
has remained unmentioned. Raoul Berger's manuscript, Impeach-
ment: The Constitutional Problems, is an excellent presentation of
constitutional philosophy. The arguments of the author are often
buttressed by irrefutable authority; his positions are concisely stated,
handsomely supported and convincing in detail and logic. The prob-
lems I have discussed above should not be viewed as detracting from
Berger's scholarly contribution to understanding of the "supreme
law of the land." His ability to frame the issues and present strongly
structured arguments in support of his views is often refreshing, and
always appreciated. Without reservation, the work is recommended.
F
